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By examining a sample of non-listed Chinese firms, we provide the first evidence from 
China for the effect of managerial ownership on firm performance. In matching-sample 
comparisons, we find that firms of significant managerial ownership outperform firms whose 
managers do not own equity shares. Our further results indicate the relation between firm 
performance and managerial ownership is nonlinear, and the inflection point at which the 
relation turns negative occurs at ownership above 50 percent. Compared with previous studies, 
our results are less likely to suffer from an endogeneity problem due to the non-list nature of 
our sample and the unique institutional environment in China.  
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1.   Introduction  
The separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation results in a conflict-of-
interest problem between shareholders and the management (Berle and Means, 1932). Agency 
theory contends that incentive schemes should be used to mitigate this problem (Mirrlees, 1976, 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In the past few decades, a number of studies have examined various 
managerial incentive schemes. Recent studies tend to conclude that cash compensation – the 
conventional incentive device – plays a negligible role in providing incentives to managers.1 On 
the other hand, equity holdings including stock options are believed to be the dominating 
component of managerial incentives (Hall and Liebman, 1998, Murphy, 1999).  
It remains unclear whether managerial ownership matters for company performance in 
practice. If it does, as agency theory predicts, one should observe superior performance of firms 
with high managerial ownership. Previous studies have examined the relation between the firm’s 
ownership structure and its performance, and to date, the evidence is mixed. Morck et al. (1988), 
McConnell and Servaes (1990), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), and Core and Larcker (2002) 
document a significant effect of insider ownership on corporate performance. On the other hand, 
others, including Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Loderer and Martin (1997), and Himmelberg et al. 
(1999), do not identify a meaningful association between ownership and performance.  
This literature extensively examines U.S. firms and other developed markets. To our best 
knowledge, no study has examined Chinese firms for the managerial ownership-performance 
relationship. One apparent reason is that under the unique regulatory environment in China 
(which we discuss in Section 2), managerial ownership in listed companies is usually very low. 
                                                 
1 Kole (1997) and Zhou and Swan (2003) show the complicated issues regarding compensation 
contracts that remain to be understood. 
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For a sample of 5,284 publicly traded Chinese firms, Wei et al. (2005) report an average stock 
holding of merely 0.015 percent by senior managers and directors. Given such negligibly low 
equity holdings, the data on listed Chinese firms are not useful for identifying any meaningful 
ownership effects. Hence, prior Chinese studies on ownership structures have unanimously 
ignored managerial shares. 
In this study, we examine the managerial ownership-performance relation by using a unique 
sample of non-listed Chinese firms. The dataset is obtained from a World Bank survey on 
enterprise production and innovation in China. The survey contains 1,500 firms selected from ten 
industries and five cities, covering the three-year period 1998-2000. From the total sample, we 
are able to identify a subsample of 74 firms that have significant managerial shares. By 
constructing control firms that have similar firm characteristics but whose managers do not own 
equity shares, we conduct control-sample comparisons for firm performance. 
We document large differences in performance between the 74 manager-controlled firms and 
a control group of 148 size- and industry-matched firms obtained from a one-to-two matching 
process. After controlling for various firm characteristics, we estimate an average return on assets 
of 1.49 percent for manager-controlled firms, but only 0.66 percent for the matching group. From 
the total factor productivity model, we estimate the average value-added at 3.61 million RMB (or 
approximately US$437,000) per year for manager-controlled firms and 1.87 million RMB per 
year for their matching counterparts. These numbers indicate large differences in performance 
between the two groups of firms: the performance measures of manager-controlled firms double 
those of the matching firms. Our results are statistically and economically significant and robust.  
In quadratic-model regressions, we further find the performance-ownership relation to be 
nonlinear, which is consistent with many previous studies. The inflection point where the 
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performance gains from managerial ownership begin to taper off occurs at ownership above 50 
percent. This turning-point level of ownership is much higher than prior estimates for U.S. firms 
that are often a few percentage points.  
Our study contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, our findings provide the 
first evidence from China for the performance-ownership relation. Due to insufficient data on 
Chinese firms, such evidence is difficult to obtain from China’s currently listed companies. 
Second, given the uniqueness of our sample, our results are less likely to suffer from an 
endogeneity problem as compared to studies of publicly traded companies. 
An important issue under debate in the literature is whether or not the empirically observed 
association between performance and ownership is a spurious correlation due to an endogeneity 
problem. Existing studies focus on listed firms, within which insider ownership itself is a 
complex function of stock-price performance and incentive contracts so it is difficult to ideally 
control for endogeneity. Our sample is composed of non-listed firms, covering an early period of 
China’s economic reform. It has three distinct features. First, without a secondary market for 
non-listed firms, managerial ownership in our sample is not subject to open market transactions 
and hence should not meaningfully change with company performance. Second, given the 
central-planning nature of the Chinese economy and the premature market conditions, the firms’ 
ownership structures were largely determined by government policies constrained by political 
considerations. Third, important incentive schemes that are common in a developed market, such 
as high-powered bonus plans and stock options, were either negligible or simply do not exist. 
Thus, the ownership structures do not interact with complex alternative incentive schemes. With 
such features, the ownership structures are largely determined by exogenous factors irrelevant to 
incentive contracting, and hence the endogeneity concern is minimized. 
 4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the institutional 
background of the ownership reform in China. Section 3 describes the data we use in the test. 
Section 4 presents our main results for the performance effect of managerial ownership. The final 
section concludes.  
2.   The Ownership Structure of Chinese Firms 
China began its decades-long economic reform in the late 1970s. The main objective of the 
reform was to introduce market-economy mechanisms into the old system of central planning to 
enhance the efficiency of resource allocation and to increase productivity. Ever since the start of 
the reform, it has remained a challenging task for the Chinese government to reform its state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) – those that are legally owned by the state and are administered by 
central, provincial, or local governments. Early reform measures included increasing managerial 
decision autonomy, implementing incentive-based corporate tax schemes, and introducing 
performance contracts for management and employees. In the early 1990s, the government 
introduced more drastic measures intended to reform the ownership of SOEs. The 
implementation of what was called a “share ownership scheme” started the process of 
corporatization, in which SOEs were allowed to be privatized or partially privatized. Small SOEs 
could be privatized through restructuring, selling, or mergers. Middle- and large-sized enterprises 
could be partially privatized through “share issue privatization,” that is, by listing on the two 
national stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
The wave of corporatization has substantially changed the ownership structure of Chinese 
firms. After ownership restructuring and depending on its owners, a previously state-owned firm 
would typically have five types of shares: state shares, legal person shares, employee shares, 
domestic individual shares, and foreign shares. State shares are held by central, provincial, or 
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local governments, or by solely government-owned enterprises. Legal person shares are equity 
held by domestic institutions, including insurance companies, mutual funds, and other 
enterprises.  
Managerial ownership falls into the category of employee shares or domestic individual 
shares. In publicly traded companies, managerial shares mostly result from the so-called 
“company employee ownership.” Since 1993, an incorporated company going public can allocate 
up to 2.5 percent of its total equity to its employees. Employee shares become publicly tradable 
six months after the offering. Because managers in China are not granted equity shares in any 
other way (although they can purchase shares from the market using their limited personal 
money), the average stake arising from employee ownership is very low.  
For a large sample of 5,284 partially privatized former SOEs, Wei et al. (2005) report an 
average stock holding of merely 0.015 percent by senior managers and directors. Previous studies 
of Chinese firms on ownership structures and the SOE reform exclusively investigated listed 
companies. Because managerial ownership in such companies is negligibly low, these studies 
have unanimously ignored managerial shares (e.g., Qi et al., 2000; Sun and Tong, 2003; Wang et 
al., 2004; Wei et al., 2005). 
On the other hand, managerial equity holdings can be substantive in small and typically non-
listed companies. There are two main cases in which a Chinese firm’s manager can own a large 
portion of the firm’s equity. In the first case, the firm started as a small enterprise, originally 
controlled or solely owned by the manager. Since the late 1970s when China began its economic 
reform, there has been a sustained growth of such entrepreneur-controlled companies. In the 
second case, the manager of a previously state-owned enterprise became a major shareholder 
after the company was privatized, in which the shares were sold, wholly or partially, to legal 
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persons or individual investors including the manager. After such a significant restructuring 
event, managerial shares would typically not change from year to year. In either case, the 
manager’s personal wealth is likely to impose a binding constraint on her or his capacity for 
holding equity shares. 
3.   Data 
Our data set is constructed from a World Bank survey on enterprise production and 
innovation in China. The survey was designed by the Development and Economic Research 
Department of the World Bank and was conducted by China’s National Bureau of Statistics. In 
the survey, a sample of 1,500 Chinese firms was drawn from five cities and ten industries for the 
period of 1998-2000. The five cities were chosen so that they are representative in terms of 
economic development and reform progress, and so that the fast-growing and most economically 
developed regions (Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai) contrast with less-developed and 
economically more conservative regions (Tianjin and Chengu). The 10 industries, based on 
China’s industrial classification2, include five manufacturing sectors (apparel and leather goods, 
consumer goods, electronic components, electronic equipment, and vehicles and vehicle parts) 
and five service sectors (accounting and related services, advertising and marketing, business 
logistics, communication services, and information technology services). These sectors represent 
relatively fast-growing and technologically advanced industries in China. 
The survey consists of two parts. The first part was completed by a firm’s accountant, which 
provides information on the firm’s production and performance. In addition to key performance 
                                                 
2 China’s industrial classification, GB/T 4754, was initially published in 1984 and revised in 1994 and 
2002, and is similar to the 1989 industrial classification announced by the United Nations (ISIC/Rev.3). 
Detailed information on China’s industrial classification can be found in the following Web site: 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjbz/hyflbz/. 
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measures, this part also details the firm’s ownership structure, specifying state shares, legal 
person shares, and managerial shares. Managerial shares refer to equity held by the top manager 
and her or his family members. The second part of the survey was completed by a firm’s senior 
manager. It provides information on the firm’s innovation and external relations with clients, 
suppliers, government, and research institutions. The variables used in our study are mostly from 
the first part of the survey data.  
Of the total sample, 83 firms have managerial ownership, which account for 5.5 percent of all 
firms in the sample.3 Such a percentage of firms with managerial ownership is very small as 
compared to typical situations in a developed market. On the other hand, this difference precisely 
reflects the unique market and institutional environment in China. Unlike a result of incentive 
contracting or governance design, managerial ownership in China depends on government 
reform policies that, being largely exogenous under the reform strategy of “crossing the river by 
touching stones,” have determined the development of entrepreneur-owned companies and the 
privatization of SOEs. Apparently, constrained by government policies and managers’ personal 
wealth, managerial ownership was not a widely adopted mechanism in China in the late 1990s. 
Table 1 shows the distribution of managerial ownership across industry and over ownership 
level for the 83 firms with managerial ownership. The left panel shows the distribution by 
industry, which indicates notable differences between these firms and the total sample. For 
instance, for the total sample, 7.3 percent are in business logistics services and 14.4 percent in 
vehicles and vehicle parts. However, for the subsample of the firms with managerial ownership, 
the corresponding percentages are zero percent and 7.2 percent, respectively. 
                                                 
3 We note that the firms with managerial ownership are notably smaller than those without managerial 
ownership. If we exclude the firms without managerial ownership that have sales higher than the 
maximum sales of the firms with managerial ownership, this percentage rises to 8.4. 
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The right panel shows the ownership distribution is highly concentrated: 34 managers were 
sole proprietors, and the average managerial ownership of all 83 firms was as high as 70 percent 
(among which, only four firms’ managerial ownership was less than 10 percent). This 
observation, together with the fact that a small number of firms had managerial ownership, 
further suggests that managerial ownership in China was not an equilibrium outcome of incentive 
contracting but was constrained by government polices and managers’ personal wealth. For 
convenience of discussion, we loosely call these 83 firms as “manager-controlled firms.”  
Manager-controlled firms have average assets of 41 million RMB, which are much smaller 
than the average assets of 183 million RMB for the rest of the total sample. This difference is 
consistent with the notion that manager-controlled firms are either small and previously state-
owned enterprises that were privatized and subsequently owned by individual investors including 
the managers, or are relatively new companies that have grown rapidly during the reform period. 
It is hence not surprising that the 34 firms solely owned by managers have average assets of 
merely 13.5 million RMB. These firms were mostly set up in the mid-1990s. 
Our main objective is to compare managerial performance between manager-controlled firms 
and those with no managerial ownership. However, given the large difference in size between 
these two groups of firms, it is difficult to make the comparison by simply pooling all firms in 
one regression and using a variable to control for size. It has been well observed that firm size is 
associated with both managerial incentive measures and firm performance measures, and that 
these associations are typically nonlinear. For similar reasons, industry heterogeneity may also 
complicate our comparison. To mitigate the problem of firm size and industry heterogeneity, we 
construct matching samples: For each of the manager-controlled firms (which is our treatment 
group), we identify a matching firm of which the manager does not own equity shares and which 
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is of similar size and the same industry. We then compare the performance between the manager-
controlled firms and their size- and industry-matched counterparts, controlling for various other 
firm characteristics.  
Before matching, we exclude two publicly traded companies from the treatment group. As 
discussed earlier, the ownership structure of listed companies is likely to suffer from reverse 
causality due to open-market transactions. Furthermore, because listed companies are subject to 
market discipline and more stringent government regulations, the incentive schemes are expected 
to be different from those in non-listed companies. We further exclude five firms with foreign 
investment because the presence of foreign investors might help improve the firms’ performance 
by bringing in advanced technology and stronger monitoring. We also exclude one firm that 
appears to be an obvious outliner, of which the average return on assets is as high as 3,800 
percent, although the sample average is just one percent. 
For each of the 75 remaining manager-controlled firms, we identify two matching firms from 
the rest of the total sample. A matching firm must be in the same industry and must have a size 
similar to that of the manager-controlled firm. Size is measured by the firm’s total assets. A 
matching firm is considered to be of a similar size if its total assets are between 70 percent and 
130 percent of that of the manager-controlled firm. Because we were unable to find a match for 
one manager-controlled firm, the final sample consists of 74 manager-controlled firms and 148 
matching firms. 
The first two panels of Table 2 present the summary statistics of selected firm variables for 
the sample in which the matching firms are denoted as “matching group A.” As expected, the 
treatment group and the matching group have quite similar size distributions, in which the mean 
and median assets are both very close between the two groups. Sales and labor are alternative 
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proxies for firm size, which are also similar between the two groups. We also observe two 
notable differences between the firms. First, legal person shares appear to be more important 
relative to state shares with the treatment group (17.6 percent legal person shares vs. 3.0 percent 
state shares on the average) than with the matching group (44.9 percent legal person shares vs. 
34.4 percent state shares on the average). Second, the manager-controlled firms are younger than 
the matching firms. The mean and median firm ages are 7.5 years and 6.0 years, respectively, for 
the treatment group, and 15.4 years and 10.0 years, respectively, for the matching group.  
Some recent studies on Chinese firms suggest a negative effect of state shares and a positive 
effect of legal person shares on company performance (e.g., Qi et al., 2000; Sun and Tong, 2003; 
Wei et al., 2005). Such effects are often controlled by a variable for state shares or legal person 
shares. However, this approach may not work with our data because the percentage of state 
shares in the treatment group is negligibly small. For this reason, we also construct another two 
matching groups, one consisting of SOEs that have 100 percent state shares, which we call 
“matching group B,” and the other consisting of non-SOEs that have no shares directly held by 
the state, which we call “matching group C.” Using a similar matching strategy, we require the 
matching firms to be in the same industries as, and to have assets close to, that of the manager-
controlled firms. With fewer firms available for this separated matching, we perform one-to-one 
matching and identify 74 firms for each matching group.  
The third and fourth panels of Table 2 present the summary statistics for matching groups B 
and C, respectively. Clearly, both groups have similar size distributions as that of the treatment 
group. Legal person shares are dominating in matching group C (averaged 65.0 percent), while 
by design, they are nonexistent in matching group B. Because non-SOEs include entrepreneur-
owned firms that are relatively young, firms in matching group C are a few years younger than 
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those in matching group B.  
4.   Empirical Results 
We use two performance measures in our examination. The first measure is the firm’s ROA, 
computed as the firm’s profits divided by its assets. Profits are sales revenue minus operating 
costs, which are close to earnings before interest payments and taxes. The second measure is 
value-added, calculated as sales revenue less intermediate goods. Both ROA and value-added are 
proxies for managerial efficiency, which, as an accounting performance measure, have the 
advantage of being unaffected by equity-market volatilities. Another advantage of these 
performance measures is that because the firms are not publicly held and hence are not subject to 
regulatory disclosure requirements, the managers are not as strongly motivated as managers of 
listed companies to manipulate the measures to influence public opinion. 
The firm’s return on equity is another popular accounting performance measure used in the 
literature. However, there is a limitation in our data: the World Bank survey provides the 
information on equity and debt only for the year 2000. We do not use this performance measure 
in this study. 
4.1.   Base Regressions 
We now further examine the managerial-ownership effect on performance using two 
regression models. The first model estimates the firm’s ROA, taking the following linear form: 
ROA it  =  α  +  β  × ( Managerial ownership i )  + ∑
j
γ jitjX  +  ε it   (1) 
where subscripts i and t denote firm and year, respectively. The first term is a constant, which 
allows for industry effects. The second term is a dummy variable for managerial ownership, 
which equals one for manager-controlled firms and zero for matching firms. The coefficient β 
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captures the performance effect of managerial ownership, which is our main concern. jitX  is the 
jth control variable, and itε  is the error term. 
The set of control variables, ∑
j
j
itjXγ , captures various firm characteristics that potentially 
affect the performance measures. In addition to firm size, we also control for firm age, leverage, 
external auditors appointment, state shares, and legal person shares. Firm age is a proxy for the 
firm’s development stage and may be associated with certain levels or patterns of the firm’s 
performance. The summary statistics in Table 2 show notable differences in firm age between 
manager-controlled firms and matching firms. We thus control for firm age heterogeneity. 
Leverage, external auditors, and legal person shares are all potential factors influencing a firm’s 
governance and performance, so they are also included in the model. We also use an alternative 
control variable, the ratio of legal person shares over state shares, to simultaneously control for 
state shares and legal-person shares. Since our data provide information on equity and debt only 
for the year 2000, the variable of leverage is constant for each firm. The effect of external 
auditors is captured by a dummy variable, which equals one for firms that appoint external 
auditors and equals zero for other firms. Year and city dummies are also included in the model. 
The second regression model estimates the firm’s total factor productivity (TFP), using the 
logistic Cobb-Douglas function: 
ln (Value added it )  =  α  +  β1 × ( Managerial Ownership i ) 
     +  β2  × ln (Capital it )  +  β3 × ln (Labor it )  + ∑
j
γ jitjX  +  ε it    (2) 
where capital is the firm’s total assets, and labor is the number of employees. Other variables in 
model (2) are similarly defined as in model (1). The coefficient β1 estimates the effect of 
managerial ownership on the firm’s productivity. 
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Table 3 presents our base-model regressions, which compare the performance between the 74 
manager-controlled firms and the 148 size- and industry-matched control firms (matching group 
A). Columns 1-3 report the regressions of ROA, and columns 4-6 report the regressions of value-
added. As discussed above, to avoid the interaction of managerial shares and state shares, we do 
not directly include state shares in the base-model regressions. Instead, we use an alternative 
variable – the ratio of legal person shares over state shares – to simultaneously control for both 
factors. Columns (3) and (6) present the regressions using this approach. The effect of state 
shares is further examined below by using matching groups B and C. The two models fit the data 
well, where the adjusted R2 is close to 20 percent for the estimation of ROA and about 60 percent 
for the estimation of value-added.  
In all six regressions, the coefficient on the dummy variable of managerial ownership is 
positive and statistically significant, mostly, at the one percent level. This observation, together 
with the large magnitude of the coefficient, suggests a strong positive effect of managerial 
ownership on company performance. To gauge the economic significance of this effect, we 
obtain the point estimates of ROA and value-added using the regressions in columns (2) and (5), 
respectively. Based on the mean values of the firm variables for the matching-firm group,4 we 
estimate ROA at 0.66 percent and value-added at 1.86 million RMB. When these firms were 
owned or controlled by the managers (by setting the managerial ownership dummy to one), the 
estimate of ROA increases to 1.49 percent, and the estimate of value-added increases to 3.61 
million RMB. These numbers show an economically strong effect of managerial ownership; both 
performance measures are about doubled with the inclusion of managerial ownership. 
The coefficients on the control variables are mostly consistent with previous studies. The 
                                                 
4 Very similar results are obtained when the median values of firm variables are used in the 
estimation. 
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logarithm of assets is clearly an important determinant of the firm’s performance, of which the 
coefficient is statistically highly significant in all regressions. The logarithm of labor is also a 
significant factor in the determination of the firm’s productivity.  
The coefficient on the debt-equity ratio is negative and becomes marginally significant in the 
regressions of TFP. This finding is inconsistent with the standard capital structure theory, which 
predicts a higher default risk and thus higher returns for firms of higher leverage. On the other 
hand, a negative effect of debt is in line with the soft-budget constraint theory that predicts higher 
agency costs of debt with soft-budget constraints (Kornai, 1980). 
Other control variables are either insignificant or have mixed coefficient estimates. Since the 
coefficients on the control variables (except firm age, which is further examined in Section 4.3) 
do not change qualitatively in the various regressions, we will ignore the effects of these 
variables in later discussions. 
Table 4 reports the regressions for the comparison between manager-controlled firms and 
matching groups A and B separately. All the control variables, including year, industry, and city 
dummies, are included in the regressions. The coefficients on the control variables are not 
reported in this table. 
We have two main observations from Table 4. First, consistent with the results reported in 
Table 3, the regressions in Table 4 show a significantly positive effect of managerial 
shareholdings on performance, both in the comparison with matching group B and in the 
comparison with matching group C. Because group C consists only of non-SOEs that have no 
state shares, the comparison with this group is particularly interesting, further highlighting the 
role of managerial ownership incentives. These results reinforce our findings from Table 3 and 
further confirm that the positive effect of managerial ownership is not driven by a lack of state 
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shares at the manager-controlled firms. 
On the other hand, the estimates do suggest a stronger performance effect in the comparison 
with matching group B than with matching group C. This is our second observation. The 
difference is explicit and more notable in the regressions of the TFP model. For instance, based 
on the mean values of the firm variables, managerial ownership would increase value-added from 
2.32 million RMB to 3.28 million RMB for non-SOEs and more significantly, from 1.74 million 
RMB to 4.18 million RMB for SOEs. This observation lends further support to the proposition 
that managerial ownership mitigates agency costs and improves company performance. When 
state shares provide a weaker role than non-state shares in monitoring, state-owned enterprises 
should incur the highest agency costs, and hence the benefit of managerial ownership should be 
strongest for such firms. 
We have so far ignored the equity shares held by individuals other than the top manager and 
her or his family members. The World Bank survey also provides information on equity shares 
held by such individuals, which we call individual shares. Individual shares present the 
ownership of individual investors or the firm’s employees, or both. Employee shares in China are 
subject to government regulations and, on the average, account for less than two percent of a 
listed firm’s total equity. For non-listed companies, however, both employee shares and the 
shares held by individual investors can be significant. Of the World Bank survey sample, 359 
firms have individual shares of which 312 have total individual shares higher than 20 percent. At 
such high levels, individual shares can be concentrated and one cannot exclude the possibility 
that employees or individual investors play an active role in monitoring the management, hence 
influencing the firm’s performance. 
This possibility can complicate our results. In the presence of both managerial shares and 
 16
individual shares, our tests would not distinguish the performance effects between these two 
factors. A simple method for disentangling the effects is to add a variable in models (1) and (2) to 
control for individual shares. Alternatively, we can use a dummy variable for firms with 
significant individual shares (e.g., for individual shareholdings above 20 percent), which are 
more likely to be associated with concentrated individual ownership.  
We use both methods to address this issue. To compare alternative specifications for the 
control of legal person shares, state shares, and individual shares, we run four different 
regressions for both ROA and TFP. Table 5 presents the regressions based on the models in 
Table 3, including a control for individual shares. In six out of eight regressions, the coefficient 
on individual shares, as a dummy variable or as a percentage of total equity, has mixed signs and 
is statistically not different from zero. In the other two regressions (columns 5 and 7), the 
coefficient is significantly positive. 
Importantly, after we control for individual shares, the coefficient on the managerial 
ownership dummy remains significantly positive in all regressions, although the significance 
level slightly drops in some of the ROA regressions compared with their counterparts in Table 3. 
It is interesting to note the difference between the regressions in columns 5 and 7 and their 
counterparts in Table 3. In these two regressions, the coefficient on individual shares is 
significantly positive, but the coefficient on the managerial ownership dummy becomes greater 
and with a slightly higher significance level than its counterpart in Table 3 (columns 5 and 6). 
Therefore, these two regressions show a strengthened performance effect of managerial 
ownership after controlling for individual shares. 
4.2.   Nonlinearities between Firm Performance and Managerial Ownership 
Many previous studies document a nonlinear relation between managerial ownership and firm 
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performance. The relation is positive at low levels of ownership and then turns negative for 
ownership above a certain level. In our sample, the majority of the firms with managerial shares 
are either solely owned or substantially controlled by managers so the ownership structure is 
highly concentrated. For this reason, we have so far used a dummy variable to capture the effect 
of managerial shares. On the other hand, although managerial shares in our sample are 
concentrated at high levels, the distribution also shows a notable variation (see Table 1). 
Following McConnell and Servaes (1990) and others, we examine in this section the nonlinear 
ownership-performance relation by using continuous variables for managerial shares.  
Table 6 presents the regressions for this examination, in which managerial ownership is 
measured as the percentage of the firm’s equity held by the manager. Three functions are used to 
characterize the ownership effect, which are linear, quadratic, and logarithm functions. To avoid 
causing missing values, in the logarithm function, an ownership level of 0.1 percent is assumed 
when the ownership is zero. All control variables discussed above, including the dummy 
variables, are included in the regressions.  
We have two observations from these regressions. First, consistent with our findings 
discussed above, the liner and logarithm models in columns 1, 3, 4, and 6 show an overall 
positive relationship between performance and managerial ownership. The coefficient on the 
ownership variable is positive in all four regressions, and is significant or marginally significant 
in three of them. Our earlier results further suggest that the performance-ownership relation is 
stronger with the model of value added than with that of ROA. This is also the case with these 
regressions using continuous ownership variables. 
Second, consistent with previous studies, the coefficients in the quadratic regressions, 
columns 2 and 5, indicate an inverted-U shape relation between performance and ownership. For 
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the ROA-ownership relation, the coefficients are insignificant. However, they are consistently 
with the right signs, which are robust in the various checks for the controls of legal person shares, 
state shares, and individual shares. The model of value added fits the data much better, and 
identifies a strong, highly significant inverted-U shape relationship between performance and 
managerial ownership. An inflection point occurs at ownership of 75 percent in the regression of 
ROA (column 2) and 53 percent in the regression of value added (column 5). Such a turning-
point level of ownership is much higher than the typical estimate for U.S. firms; for instance, 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) identify an inflection point at around 5 percent.  
The coefficients on the control variables are directly comparable with those reported in 
Tables 3 and 5. These coefficient estimates do not change notably and remain qualitatively the 
same as the corresponding coefficients in these two tables. 
4.3.   Potential Effects of Founding-Family Firms 
Our sample consists of mostly small and young companies and many of the managers are 
expected to be the founders. A potential problem is that our results might be complicated by a 
founder effect. By examining the S&P 500 firms, Anderson and Reeb (2003) find founding-
family firms perform better than nonfamily firms. Palia et al. (2007) report differences in 
managerial compensation between founders’ led firms and non-founder firms and also find 
evidence that founder firms are associated with higher values.  
Our data do not contain the information on company founders and their ownership, so we 
cannot directly control for the founder effect. We brief address this issue by two indirect 
approaches. In the first approach, we reexamine the base-model regressions (Table 3) by using 
firm age as a proxy for the role of founders. The intuition for this proxy variable is simple: for 
relatively young firms, the younger the firm, the more likely it is still controlled by the founder. 
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Consistent with this intuition, the summary statistics in Table 1 indicate the firms with 
managerial ownership are several years younger than the control firms. 
We examine different functional forms for firm age; in addition to the logarithm function as 
in above regressions, we also examine a linear model and a quadratic model. We obtain two 
observations from this exercise.5 First, there is a mixed effect of firm age on performance, which 
varies with the model specification and the performance measure. Second, the coefficients on the 
ownership dummy do not change qualitatively; the positive relation between performance and 
ownership remains significant and robust. 
In the second approach, we reexamine the base regressions by including a dummy variable 
for firms with 100 percent managerial ownership. Since managers of such fully owned firms are 
more likely to be the founder,6 we expect the 100%-ownership dummy to capture the effect of 
founder ownership relative to non-founder ownership. This examination also shows a mixed 
effect of the sole ownership. The coefficient on the 100%-ownership dummy is insignificant in 
the regressions for ROA, and is significantly negative in the regressions for value added. On the 
other hand, the coefficient on the ownership dummy remains to be positive and highly significant 
in all regressions, where the economic significance even increases with the value-add model. 
However, with these limited results, we are cautious not to make a conclusion about the 
founder effect. It is possible that our proxy variables do not adequately capture this effect. More 
important, it is inherently difficult to disentangle an ownership effect from a founder effect. In 
the literature regarding founder firms, one of the primary concerns is the identification of founder 
                                                 
5 The regressions for the discussions in this section are not reported, which are available upon request.  
6 Our data indicate that on average, the firms fully owned by managers are smaller and younger than 
those partially owned by mangers. However, because the firm’s owner might have changed, 100 percent 
ownership does not necessarily mean founder ownership. 
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companies. Founder families usually own substantial equity ownership. Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) find that founding family ownership “is both prevalent and substantial; families are 
present in one-third of the S&P 500 and account for 18 percent of outstanding equity” (p.1301). 
Significant founder ownership seems a general phenomenon and a founder effect unavoidably 
interacts with a substantial-ownership effect. Two further questions here are: (i) In what 
mechanism is a founder effect realized? Is it through founding family’s control due to substantial 
ownership, or through ownership-unrelated means such as founders’ expertise and reputation 
concerns? (ii) Does founding-family ownership work differently from non-founder ownership in 
influencing firm performance? To answer these questions, a careful, separate examination is 
needed, which requires detailed data on ownership structure and investor background. 
5.   Conclusion 
By examining a sample of non-listed Chinese firms, we provide the first Chinese evidence for 
managerial ownership-performance relations. This evidence is difficult to obtain from publicly 
traded companies because, given the institutional and policy constraints in China, managerial 
ownership in listed companies is mostly negligible. 
From matching-sample comparisons, we document a strong, positive effect of managerial 
ownership on firm performance. We compare firms owned or substantially controlled by 
managers with groups of size- and industry-matched firms whose managers do not own equity. 
We find that manager-controlled firms outperform matching firms. For example, for the average 
sample firm without managerial shares, our model estimates the ROA at 0.41 percent and value-
added at 1.74 million RMB. When this firm is controlled by the manager, the ROA increases to 
1.41 percent, and value-added jumps to 4.18 million RMB. Our further examination finds the 
ownership-performance relation to be nonlinear, consistent with many previous studies. 
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However, the inflection point with our sample is above 50 percent, which is much higher than the 
typical US counterpart.  
Given the unique features of the data, our test has distinct advantages in mitigating the 
potential endogeneity problem in such a test. First, without a secondary market, the managerial 
shares of non-listed companies are mostly invariant to company performance and hence our test 
is unlikely to suffer from a causality problem. Second, due to the institutional background of 
central planning and the premature development of the financial markets in China, managerial 
ownership in our sample is largely determined by exogenous government policies irrelevant to 
incentive contracting. Third, many incentive schemes that are common in a developed market, 
such as high-powered bonus plans, restricted stock awards, and stock options, either are rare or 
do not existent in China, so our data do not involve complex interactions between ownership 
incentives and alternative incentive mechanisms.  
There are apparent limitations of our data. Our sample is relatively small and it consists of 
mostly small firms. In particular, the distribution of managerial ownership does not show a 
sufficient variation. While a small number of firms in our sample have concentrated equity 
holdings by managers, other firms have no managerial ownership. Because of this problem, we 
have focused on the role of substantial ownership. Clearly, our results are uninformative of the 
ownership-performance relation at low levels of ownership, say, around five percent, which 
attracts the attention of many previous studies. 
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Table 1.  Distribution of Firms with Managerial Ownership 
 
Our sample is obtained from the World Bank survey on enterprise production and innovation in China for the period 
of 1998-2000. In the survey, 1,500 Chinese firms are drawn from five cities (Beijing, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Tianjin, 
and Shanghai) and ten industry sectors. Of the total sample, 83 firms’ managers have equity shares. This table shows 




firms Ownership range (%) Number of firms 
  Service sector:    
       Accounting services  6 2-10 4 
       Advertising & marketing  8 10-20 9 
       Business logistics services  0 20-30 9 
       Communication services  7 30-40 1 
       IT services  8 40-50 6 
  50-60 4 
  Manufacturing sector:  60-70 5 
       Apparel & leather goods 16 70-80 5 
       Consumer products  9 80-90 4 
       Electronic components  8 90-100 2 
       Electronic equipment 13  100 34 
      Vehicles & vehicle parts  6   
              Total 83 Total 83 
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of ownership structures and firm variables for our sample for regression 
models (1) and (2). As a subsample of the World Bank survey on enterprise production and innovation in China, our 
sample is obtained by matching 83 manager-controlled firms (as described in Table 1) with firms without 
managerial ownership. After excluding two listed firms, five firms with foreign shares, and one outliner from the 
manager-controlled firms, our one-to-two matching process results in 74 manager-controlled firms (the treatment 
group) and 148 matching firms (matching group A). For each manager-controlled firm, we have two matching firms, 
which are in the same industry and have a similar size, but of which the manager does not own equity shares. To 
isolate the role of state shares, we also separately match manager-controlled firms with firms of 100 percent state 
shares (matching group B) and with firms of zero state shares (matching group C). In one-to-one matches, we 
identify 74 control firms for groups B and C, respectively. Firm age is the number of years the firm has been in 
operation. External auditor is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm hires external auditing firms, and zero 
otherwise. The exchange rate between U.S. dollar and Chinese yuan (RMB) was within the range of 8.237 to 8.280 





Variable Unit Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation Observation 
Treatment group:   Firms with managerial ownership  (74 firms) 
Manager-owned shares Percent 69.0 80.0 33.5 212 
State shares Percent 3.0 0.0 11.6 212 
Legal person shares Percent 17.6 0.0 27.2 212 
Labor Workers 300.3 105.0 514.2 203 
Assets Million RMB 25.8 3.0 65.1 202 
Sales Million RMB 56.9 9.1 129.5 201 
Firm age Years 7.5 6.0 5.8 212 
Debt-equity ratio − 0.89 0.43 1.26 195 
External auditor dummy − 0.5 1.0 0.5 212 
Matching group A:  Firms without managerial ownership  (148 firms) 
State shares Percent 34.4 0.0 46.2 443 
Legal person shares Percent 44.9 20.0 46.7 443 
Labor Workers 365.1 102.0 624.4 412 
Assets Million RMB 27.1 3.4 68.5 414 
Sales Million RMB 31.6 6.5 74.8 413 
Firm age Years 15.4 10.0 14.6 443 
Debt-equity ratio − 1.22 0.11 3.00 403 
External auditor dummy − 0.5 1.0 0.5 443 
Matching group B:  SOEs without managerial ownership  (74 firms) 
State shares Percent 100.0 100.0 0.0 219 
Legal person shares Percent 0.0 0.0 0.0 219 
Labor Workers 369.0 101.0 524.7 193 
Assets Million RMB 25.9 3.9 56.0 193 
Sales Million RMB 26.5 6.3 62.5 189 
Firm age Years 19.4 12.0 17.3 219 
Debt-equity ratio − 1.31 0.00 3.19 181 
External auditor dummy − 0.6 1.0 0.5 219 
Matching group C:  Non-SOEs without managerial ownership  (74 firms) 
State shares Percent 0.0 0.0 0.0 221 
Legal person shares Percent 65.0 100.0 45.1 221 
Labor Workers 364.2 100.0 701.5 197 
Assets Million RMB 26.4 3.7 61.4 198 
Sales Million RMB 43.0 7.0 90.3 197 
Firm age Years 11.3 7.0 11.6 221 
Debt-equity ratio − 1.62 0.11 6.25 191 
External auditor dummy − 0.5 1.0 0.5 221 
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Table 3.   The Effect of Ownership: Manager-Controlled Firms vs. Matching Group A 
 
This table presents our base-regression results for the effect of managerial ownership on firm performance using 
matching group A as the control. The sample is described in Table 2. Columns 1-3 are the regressions for model (1), 
and columns 4-6 are the regressions for model (2). Return on assets is calculated as the ratio of profits to assets, and 
value added is estimated as sales less intermediate goods. The managerial ownership dummy equals one for 
manager-controlled firms and zero for matching firms. The ratio of legal person shares over state shares equals zero 
when there are no state shares. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The signs ***, **, and * represent significance 
levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Dependent variables 
Return on assets ln(Value added) 
 
 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Constant 3.936*** 3.796*** 4.027*** 2.206*** 1.444*** 1.806*** 
 (3.73) (3.19) (3.22) (5.34) (3.08) (3.76) 
       
Managerial ownership dummy 0.684*** 0.830*** 0.656** 0.648*** 0.664*** 0.578*** 
 (2.59) (2.66) (2.14) (5.21) (5.09) (4.49) 
       
ln(Assets) -0.363*** -0.417*** -0.414*** 0.319*** 0.376*** 0.356*** 
 (4.09) (4.32) (4.19) (5.97) (6.78) (6.37) 
       
ln(Labor)    0.527*** 0.560*** 0.567*** 
    (5.44) (5.56) (5.48) 
       
ln(Firm age)   0.139 0.127  -0.039 -0.042 
  (0.87) (0.78)  (0.49) (0.53) 
       
Debt-equity ratio  -0.007 -0.126  -0.042* -0.042* 
  (0.23) (0.38)  (1.79) (1.82) 
       
External auditor dummy  0.133 0.095  0.127 0.150 
  (0.52) (0.38)  (0.88) (1.03) 
       
Legal person shares (%)  0.003   0.004***  
  (1.22)   (2.65)  
       
Legal person shares/state shares   0.054   -0.005 
   (0.71)   (0.42) 
       
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
City dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Adjusted R2 0.176 0.187 0.195 0.558 0.594 0.588 
       
Observations 586 509 509 454 404 404 
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Table 4.  The Effect of Ownership: Manager-Controlled Firms vs. Matching Groups B and C 
This table presents the regressions for the effect of managerial ownership on firm performance using matching groups B (SOEs) and C (non-SOEs), separately, 
as the control. The sample is described in Table 2. Return on assets is calculated as the ratio of profits to assets, and value added is estimated as sales less 
intermediate goods. The managerial ownership dummy equals one for manager-controlled firms and zero for matching firms. The ratio of legal person shares 
over state shares equals zero when there are no state shares. All control variables, including the year, industry, and city dummies, are included, of which the 




(Control group B) (Control group C) 
 
 
















         
Managerial ownership dummy 0.992** 1.001*** 0.884*** 1.036*** 1.122*** 1.009*** 0.349*** 0.263** 
 (2.49) (2.66) (4.10) (5.08) (3.12) (2.77) (2.77) (2.19) 
         
ln(Assets) -0.395*** -0.384*** 0.429*** 0.421*** -0.364*** -0.376*** 0.350*** 0.340*** 
 (4.18) (3.98) (6.51) (6.34) (3.72) (3.76) (6.61) (6.43) 
         
ln(Labor)   0.406*** 0.403***   0.781*** 0.794*** 
   (3.37) (3.32)   (8.30) (8.49) 
         
Legal person shares (%) 0.010  0.005      0.004  0.002  
 (1.03)  (1.46)  (1.33)  (1.28)  
         
Legal person shares /state shares  0.055  -0.013     0.037  0.004 
  (0.71)  (1.02)  (1.06)  (0.93) 
         
Intercept and control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Adjusted R2 0.225 0.236 0.639 0.638 0.185 0.199 0.753 0.752 
         
Observations 331 331 262 262 356 356 292 292 
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Table 5.  The Effect of Managerial Ownership after Controlling for Individual Shares 
The regressions in this table are based on the regressions in Table 3 with complete control variables. A control variable for non-managerial individual shares 
(defined as equity held by individuals other than the top manager and the manager’s family members) is included, either as a percentage of the firm’s total equity 
(columns (1), (3), (5), and (7)) or as a dummy variable for individual shares equal to or above 20 percent (columns (2), (4), (6), and (8)). Return on assets is 
calculated as the ratio of profits to total assets, and value added is estimated as sales less intermediate goods. The managerial ownership dummy equals one for 
manager-controlled firms and zero for matching firms. The ratio of legal person shares over state shares equals zero when there are no state shares. The 
coefficients on the control variables, including the year, industry, and city dummies, are not reported in this table. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
signs ***, **, and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Dependent variables 
Return on assets ln(Value added) 
 
 
Independent variables    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)    (8) 
         
Managerial ownership dummy 0.734** 0.947** 0.552* 0.914** 0.900*** 0.620*** 0.678*** 0.699*** 
 (2.39) (2.17) (1.82) (2.12) (5.78) (2.88) (4.77) (3.27) 
         
ln(Assets) -0.419*** -0.418*** -0.412*** -0.414*** 0.371*** 0.376*** 0.346*** 0.358*** 
 (4.28) (4.35) (4.22) (4.20) (6.93) (6.76) (6.22) (6.37) 
         
ln(Labor)     0.592*** 0.562*** 0.588*** 0.562*** 
     (6.09) (5.52) (5.72) (5.35) 
         
Legal person shares (%) 0.002 0.003   0.007*** 0.004**   
 (0.70) (1.10)   (3.85) (2.56)   
         
Legal person shares over state shares   0.054 0.054      -0.006 -0.005 
   (0.71) (0.71)   (0.47) (0.42) 
         
Individual shares (%) -0.003  -0.004  0.008***  0.005**  
 (0.73)  (1.27)  (3.80)  (2.52)  
         
Individual shares dummy  -0.140  -0.298  0.054  -0.144 
  (0.27)  (0.61)  (0.22)  (0.64) 
         
Intercept and control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Adjusted R2 0.188 0.187 0.198 0.196 0.610 0.595 0.594 0.588 
         
Observations 509 509 509 509 404 404 404 404 
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Table 6.  Nonlinearities between Firm Performance and Managerial Ownership 
This table presents the regressions of firm performance on managerial ownership as a percentage of the firm’s equity. Three functional forms are used for 
managerial ownership, which are linear, quadratic, and logarithm functions. The sample, described in Table 2, consists of 74 manager-controlled firms and 148 
matching firms (matching group A). Return on assets is calculated as the ratio of profits to assets, and value added is estimated as sales less intermediate goods. 
Individual shares are the equity held by individuals other than the top manager and the manager’s family members, as a percentage of the firm’s total equity. The 
ratio of legal person shares over state shares equals zero when there are no state shares. All control variables, including the year, industry, and city dummies, are 
included, of which the coefficients are not reported in this table.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively.  
 
Dependent variables 
Return on assets ln(Value added) 
 
 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Constant 4.275*** 4.301*** 4.405*** 1.738*** 1.890*** 2.068*** 
 (3.23) (3.25) (3.37) (3.53) (3.91) (3.86) 
       
Managerial ownership (%) 0.005 0.015  0.005*** 0.042***  
 (1.18) (1.28)  (2.96) (5.34)  
       
Managerial ownership Squared  -0.0001   -0.0004***  
  (0.79)   (4.70)  
       
ln(Managerial ownership)   0.080*   0.104** 
   (1.60)   (1.97) 
       
ln (Assets) -0.411*** -0.412*** -0.411*** 0.350*** 0.316*** 0.356*** 
 (4.20) (4.22) (4.21) (6.11) (6.02) (6.34) 
       
ln (Labor)    0.581*** 0.635*** 0.566*** 
    (5.49) (6.52) (5.40) 
       
Legal person shares over state shares 0.060 0.057 0.055 0.002 -0.010 -0.003 
 (0.79) (0.74) (0.73) (0.17) (0.87) (0.26) 
       
Individual shares (%)  -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 0.004** 0.003* 0.137 
 (1.42) (1.48) (1.30) (2.20) (1.95) (0.41) 
       
Intercept and control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Adjusted R2 0.195 0.196 0.197 0.599 0.604 0.599 
       
Observations 509 509 509 404 404 404 
 
